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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On March 22, 2013, the Journal of Law and Health of Cleveland-Marshall 
College of Law hosted a symposium entitled the “Legal and Ethical Implications of 
Posthumous Reproduction” in response to the United States Supreme Court case 
Astrue v Capato. In Astrue, Karen Capato used Robert Capato’s sperm to 
successfully conceive twins by in vitro fertilization eighteen months after Robert 
Capato’s death.1 Karen then applied for Social Security Survivorship Benefits on 
behalf of the twins, but to her dismay the Social Security Administration denied her 
application, prompting litigation on the twins’ behalf.2  
Ms. Capato appealed her case to a federal district court where the court was 
asked to resolve whether her posthumously conceived children were eligible for 
Social Security Survivorship Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. Ms. 
Capato argued that the twins were eligible because they were the biological children 
of Robert Capato.3 The Social Security Administration disagreed with Ms. Capato, 
arguing that the twins claim should be denied because they were ineligible under 
Florida’s intestacy law.4 Florida’s intestacy law denies such benefits to 
                                                 
* Editor-in-Chief, Journal of Law & Health, 20122013; J.D., Cleveland State University, 
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. Thank you Journal staff for helping make this 
symposium possible. A special thank you to Nicholas Kopcho, Sasha Swoveland, and 
Professor Browne Lewis for each of your efforts in making this symposium a great success for 
our publication.   
 1 Astrue v. Capato, 132 S.Ct. 2021, 202526 (2012).   
 2 Id. at 2025. 
 3 Id. at 2029.  
 4 Id.  
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posthumously conceived children and, therefore, the administration concluded, the 
twins were ineligible for the benefits.5  
The Supreme Court held that the Social Security Administration’s reading of 
Title II of the Social Security Act deserved deference regarding inheritance rights of 
posthumously conceived children.6 Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice 
Ginsberg noted that the lower court’s interpretation of “child” was correct and 
served the core purpose of the Act, which was to provide benefits for dependents of 
wage earners after their death.7  
II.  POSTHUMOUS REPRODUCTION 
Posthumous reproduction is the possibility of conceiving a child after the sperm 
or egg donor dies. One of the more important interests considered when debates 
concerning posthumous reproduction occur is an individual’s right to reproduce and 
build a family. In 1942, Justice William Douglas stated that the right to procreate is 
one the most basic civil rights of man when the Supreme Court struck down 
Oklahoma’s plan to sterilize criminals in the state.8 With the advent of new 
reproductive technologies—such as surrogacy, artificial insemination, and other 
forms of assisted technology—individuals now have the ability to procreate in ways 
not available in 1942 when Justice Douglas wrote the Skinner opinion.  
The ability to conceive a child even after the death of the child’s biological 
parent is a significant scientific achievement, but has complicated regulations that 
did not consider such technological advancements in reproductive capabilities. 
Intrauterine reproduction, or artificial insemination as it is commonly called, has 
been successfully used to conceive children since 1866.9 However, only recently has 
technology developed a method in which gametes can be successfully preserved for 
long periods of time and used to conceive a child—long after the biological parent 
has been dead.10 Such scientific capabilities in posthumous reproduction have caused 
courts to rethink traditional notions of parenthood and inheritance.11  
The way in which inheritance rights are provided for posthumously born children 
is an ongoing debate in America, as many states deal with children born from the 
procedure differently.12 The question of whether posthumously born children are 
eligible for the benefits provided under the Social Security Act has been one of the 
                                                 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. at 2034.  
 7 Id. at 2033. 
 8 Skinner v. State of Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 543 (1942) (holding that compulsory 
sterilization could not be imposed as a punishment for a crime).  
 9 See Johnson v. Super Ct., 101 Cal. App. 4th 869, 881 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).  
 10 Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Dead Dads: Thawing an Heir From the Freezer, 35 WM 
MITCHELL L. REV. 433, 434 (2009).  
 11 See Hecht v. Superior Court (Kane), 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (finding 
that the act of posthumous reproduction is not against public policy and the court abused its 
discretion in ordering that a decedent’s sperm be destroyed). 
 12 See Hecht v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222 (1996). In Hecht, a deceased man’s 
frozen sperm was awarded to his girlfriend pursuant to his will after a 6 year long battle with 
the decedent’s children. See id. 
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most recent issues debated.  Most states simply assume that someone cannot be the 
father of a child nine months after the death of that person.13 In Astrue, the Supreme 
Court was asked to determine whether a pair of twins born a year after their father’s 
death were eligible for Social Security benefits when those benefits were 
traditionally only afforded to dependents. Arguably, the twins were not dependent on 
their father because he died before they were even conceived.  
III.  TITLE II OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 
The Social Security Act was amended in 1939 to provide monthly benefit 
payments to surviving family members of deceased wage earners.14 The purpose 
behind the act was to provide economic protections for dependent family members 
in the event an insured wage earner in the family would die. Providing benefits to 
surviving children of a deceased wage earner is one of the many categories of 
benefits offered. For children to be eligible for benefits under the section entitled 
“Child’s Insurance Benefits,” the applicant must be a “child” of the wage earner. The 
threshold determination of an applicant to receive benefits is that the child must be 
unmarried, below a specific age limit (which is usually 18 or 19), and dependent on 
the insured at the time of the insured’s death.15  
The task the Supreme Court had in Astrue was to determine whether the Capato 
twins were considered children of Robert Capato under the Act in order to receive 
the benefits. Section 402(d) of the Act provides that “[e]very child (as defined in 
section 416(e) of this title)” of a deceased insured individual “shall be entitled to a 
child’s insurance benefit.”16 Section 416(e) subsequently states that “[t]he term child 
means (1) the child or legally adopted child of an individual, (2) a stepchild [under 
certain circumstances], and (3) . . . the grandchild or stepgrandchild of an individual 
or his spouse [who meets certain conditions].”17 As the Supreme Court points out, § 
416(e)(1) does nothing more than simply state that a child, under § 416(e)(1),  is 
eligible for benefits if the applicant child is a “child or legally adopted child” of the 
deceased wage earner.18 In Astrue, the twins were the biological children of Robert 
Capato and, under this section, seem to be eligible for benefits.  
However, a subsequent section in the Act clarifies the intention of the 
lawmaker’s preferred definition of child when drafting the Act. The section is 
entitled “Determination of Family Status” in § 416(h)(2)(A) of the Act states that 
“[i]n determining whether an applicant is the child or parent of [an] insured 
individual for purposes of this subchapter, the Commissioner of Social Security shall 
apply [the intestacy law of the insured individual's domiciliary State].”19 This section 
plainly states that, to determine whether a particular applicant is a “child” for the 
                                                 
 13 See, e.g., Fred H. Cate, Posthumous Autonomy Revisited, 69 IND. L.J. 1067 (1994); 
Karin Mika & Bonnie Hurst, One Way to be Born? Legislative Inaction and the Posthumous 
Child, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 993 (1996).  
 14 See Social Security Act, 53 Stat. 1364, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 402 (1939).  
 15 Id. at § 402(d). 
 16 Astrue, 132 S.Ct. at 2027.   
 17 Id.  
 18 Id.  
 19 Id. at 2028.  
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purposes of the statute, the applicant’s state intestacy law should be used to 
determine whether they are a child. Therefore, under the Act, the law of the state 
where a posthumously born child is born determines whether that child is entitled to 
Social Security benefits.  
The case revolved around a statutory construction issue. Section 416(e) provides 
that a child of a deceased wage earner is eligible for benefits while § 416(h) states 
that each state’s intestacy law determines who is a child. The Astrue twins were 
undeniably the children of the wage earner, Robert Capato. Why then is the 
application of § 416(h) necessary? Some federal courts concluded that the 
application of § 416(h) was unnecessary when it was indisputable that the twins were 
Robert Capato’s biological children. Others argued that the application of § 416(h) 
was necessary and that posthumously born children were only eligible for benefits 
under the Act if the state that they lived in recognized them as children for 
inheritance purposes.  
IV.  ASTRUE V. CAPATO 
In May 1999, Robert and Karen Capato were married.20 Shortly after the 
marriage, Robert was diagnosed with esophageal cancer, which has a very poor 
prognosis.21 The couple was told by Robert’s treating physician that the 
chemotherapy for the treatment of Robert’s cancer could possibly leave him sterile.22 
Since both Robert and Karen wanted children, Robert deposited sperm at a local 
sperm bank to be frozen, stored, and used for in vitro fertilization after his battle with 
cancer in the unfortunate event that the treatment did cause Robert to become 
sterile.23  
After Robert’s diagnosis and during his treatment, the Capatos successfully 
conceived a child by natural means.24 Shortly after the birth of this child, Robert’s 
condition rapidly worsened and his health deteriorated. In March of 2002, Robert 
Capato died of cancer.25 In Robert’s will that he executed three months before his 
death he named his son and children from a previous marriage as beneficiaries. In 
the will he never made mention of any future, unborn child.  
Nine months after Robert’s death, using his deposited sperm, Karen became 
pregnant via in vitro fertilization and nine months later successfully delivered a pair 
of twins. Shortly after the twins were born, Karen filed for survivorship benefits on 
behalf of the twins under Title II of the Social Security Act. To her dismay, the 
Social Security Administration denied her claim. Karen appealed that decision with 
the Social Security Administration and a federal court heard her case. 
The federal U.S District Court for the District of New Jersey affirmed the 
agencies denial of benefits to the twins. The district court held that a biological child 
                                                 
 20  Astrue, 132 S.Ct. at 2026.   
 21 Peter C. Enzinger, M.D. & Robert J. Mayer, M.D., Medical Progress: Esopageal 
Cancer, NEW ENG. J. MED. 349:23, 2241 (2003) (“Worldwide, esophageal cancer is the sixth 
leading cause of death from cancer.”). 
 22 Astrue, 132 S.Ct. at 2026.   
 23 Id.  
 24 Id.  
 25 Id.  
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of a deceased wage earner conceived through posthumous reproduction must 
establish that the child could inherit from the deceased under state law pursuant to § 
416(h) of the Act.26 Robert Capato was domiciled in Florida when he died and 
therefore, the court held, Florida intestacy law applied to the case.27 Unfortunately 
for Karen, Florida law only allows for posthumously born children to inherit by 
express provision in a will, which Robert had in fact made without mentioning any 
biological children born subsequent to his death.  
Karen Capato prevailed in her arguments at the next level. The Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit held that “the undisputed, biological child of a deceased wage 
earner and his widow” qualify for survivorship benefits and thus the biological child 
is considered a child under the Act; therefore, there is no need apply § 416(h) to 
determine whether the twins were eligible under Florida’s intestacy statute.28 Like 
the Third Circuit, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in Gillett-Netting v. 
Bardhart that a biological but posthumously conceived child of an insured wage 
earner and his widow are entitled to Social Security benefits under Title II.29 
However, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and the Fourth Circuit held 
that a posthumously born child’s eligibility for benefits under the act depends on the 
intestacy law of the state in which the child is domiciled.30 The Supreme Court of the 
United States granted certiorari in the case to resolve the split in the lower federal 
courts about the proper standard to determine who is a child of a deceased wage 
earner under the Social Security Act. 
When Karen Capato applied for social security benefits for the twins, the Social 
Security Administration determined that Florida’s intestacy law did not define the 
twins as children of Robert Capato. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals located in 
St. Louis agreed with the Social Security Administration and held that § 416(h) of 
the Act was the “exclusive means to which an applicant can establish ‘child’ status” 
to be eligible for benefits.31 Therefore, in the view of the Eighth Circuit and the 
Social Security Administration, § 416(h) is the gateway to determine whether an 
applicant is considered a “child” under the Act.  
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals and Ms. Capato disagreed with the federal 
circuit court and the Social Security Administration. The Third Circuit held that § 
416(h) is irrelevant when § 416(e) alone is dispositive in determining whether an 
applicant is a “child.”32 The Third Circuit reasoned that under § 416(e) “child” 
means “child of the deceased wage earner,” and the Capato twins were “undeniably 
the children of Robert Capato, the insured wage earner.”33 How did the court come 
                                                 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. (Under that State’s (Florida’s) law, the court noted, a child born posthumously may 
inherit through intestate succession only if conceived during the decedent's lifetime.). 
 28 Capato ex rel. BNC v. Com’r of Social Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 631 (3d Cir. 2011).  
 29 Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 59697 (9th Cir. 2004).  
 30 Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 96064 (8th Cir. 2011); Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 
5463 (3d. Cir. 2011).  
 31 Beeler, 651 F.3d at 960. 
 32 Capato ex rel. BNC, 631 F.3d at 630. 
 33 Id. at 63031. 
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to this holding while simply ignoring § 416(h) which provides guidance in 
determining familial status? The Third Circuit was not ignorant of this section, but 
reasoned that the caption heading “Determination of Family Status” in § 416(h) was 
only to be used if the status of a child was in doubt.34 Whenever the applicant child 
is the “biological child of a married couple,” as was the case here, there is no reason 
to determine the child’s family status reasoned the Third Circuit.35 The court 
considered each section to control different situations. The Third Circuit interpreted§ 
416(e) as saying that if there is no family status to determine, there is no need to 
apply the “Determination of family status” analysis in § 416(h).  
Karen Capato’s argument and the Third Circuit’s holding concerning the Capato 
twins meeting the definition of the word “child” was flawed for a variety of reasons. 
The Third Circuit’s ruling makes the assumption that it was the intent of Congress 
when drafting the Act to define the word “child” under § 416(e) to mean exclusively 
the genetic offspring of a married couple.36 Dictionary definitions do not support this 
exclusive definition.37 Besides, elsewhere in the Act Congress expressly limited 
certain categories of benefits to only biological children of married couples.38 
Congress would have no use for limitations like these throughout the Act if their 
intent was to define “child” as, simply, the offspring of a married couple.  
Furthermore, nothing in the Act indicates that Congress expressly intended § 
416(e)’s use of the word “child” to mean the biological child of a married couple.39 
A married couple raising a child is not conclusive proof that that child’s parentage is 
certain. For instance, a couple may agree that a child is theirs while the parentage of 
the child is actually not. Lastly, if Third Circuit’s reasoning was applied correctly to 
the facts in this case, the Capato twins would not have been born by a married couple 
because, “[u]nder Florida law, marriage ends upon the death of a spouse,” and 
therefore § 416(e) would have ceased to apply when Robert died before Karen was 
pregnant.40 
In its opinion, the Supreme Court identifies a significant instruction contained in 
§ 416(h)(2)(A): “[i]n determining whether an applicant is the child . . . of [an] 
insured individual for purposes of this subchapter,” the Commissioner shall apply 
state intestacy law.41 “Subchapter” as used in this sentence identifies Subchapter II 
                                                 
 34 Id. at 631. 
 35 Id. at 630.  
 36 Astrue, 132 S.Ct. at 2029. 
 37 Id.; WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 465 (2d ed.1934) (defining “child” as 
“[i]n Law, legitimate offspring; also, sometimes, esp. in wills, an adopted child, or an 
illegitimate offspring, or any direct descendant, as a grandchild, as the intention may appear”); 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 214 (11th ed. 2003) (“child” means "son or 
daughter,” or “descendant”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 2.5(1) (1998) 
(“[a]n individual is the child of his or her genetic parents,” and that may be so “whether or not 
[the parents] are married to each other”). Id.  
 38 Id. at 202930. 
 39 Id. at 2030. 
 40 Price v. Price, 153 So. 904, 905 (Fla. 1934). 
 41 Astrue, 132 S.Ct. at 2031. 
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of the Social Security Act. Subchapter II spans all of §§ 401 through 434—which 
includes the definition of “child” as used in § 416(e) and § 416(h).  
Additionally, deferring to state law to determine whether an applicant is a child, 
wife, widow, husband, or widower is not uncommon.42 The core purpose of the Act 
was to “provide dependent members of a wage earner’s family with protection 
against hardship occasioned by the loss of an insured’s earnings.”43 The legislature 
recognized that a state’s intestacy statute would work much better in determining the 
eligible individuals (like the Capato twins) rather than a case-by-case basis approach, 
which would be unquestionably burdensome on the court system.  Some states do 
recognize the right of posthumously born children to inherit under their intestacy 
statute; others provide separate protections and benefits for posthumously born 
children.44 Regardless, the intent of the legislature to allow the states to define the 
definition of “child” for eligibility purposes was purposeful.  
Lastly, the Social Security Administration’s reading of the statute, which is 
reasonable, deserves deference under Chevron.45 When passing the Act, Congress 
gave the Social Security Administration the power to promulgate rules concerning 
benefits under the law. All the justices agreed that the Commissioner’s reading of the 
statute was appropriate: § 416(h)(2)(A) refers to state law to determine the status of a 
posthumously conceived child.46  
For a biological posthumously born child to receive Social Security benefits 
under the Act, the state’s intestacy statute must provide that the applicant meet the 
definition of child.47 Writing for the unanimous court, Justice Ginsburg noted that 
the circumstances were tragic but made it clear that the statute’s text “scarcely 
supports” the Supreme Court creating a uniform federal rule corning Social Security 
benefits for posthumously conceived children.48 Therefore, for a biological 
posthumously born child to receive Social Security benefits under the Act, the state’s 
intestacy statute where the wage earner was domiciled must provide that the 
applicant meet the definition of “child.” Although this ruling does not create 
nationwide uniformity in terms of whether posthumously conceived children can 
claim Social Security benefits, it does provide uniformity in how courts deal with the 
issue in each state.  
                                                 
 42 Id. (“Section § 416(h)(1)(A) directs that, “for purposes of this subchapter,” the law of 
the insured's domicile determines whether “[the] applicant and [the] insured individual were 
validly married,” and if they were not, whether the applicant would nevertheless have “the 
same status” as a wife under the State's intestacy law) (emphasis added). The Act similarly 
defines the terms “widow,” “husband,” and “widower.” See § 416(c), (f), (g), (h)(1)(A).” Id. 
 43 Id. at 2032. 
 44 Id.  
 45 Chevron USA v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 46 Astrue, 132 S.Ct. at 2034. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
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V.  OVERVIEW OF THE ARTICLES IN THIS SYMPOSIUM 
The Journal of Law and Health invited four scholars to discuss the implications 
of the Supreme Court’s holding in Astrue. Three of those scholars agreed to provide 
this publication with insightful articles in the wake of the Astrue opinion.  
A.  Professor Jessica Knouse 
Professor Jessica Knouse of the University of Toledo College of Law explores 
the constitutional rights implicated by posthumous conception. After considering the 
liberty rights of potential posthumous conceivers and the equality rights of 
posthumously conceived children, she advocates shifting the law's focus away from 
identifying “parents” and toward identifying “providers.” She argues that such a 
shift, by allowing posthumously conceived children and their families to define their 
own relationships, would promote both liberty and equality. 
B.  Professor Hilary Young 
Professor Hilary Young, Assistant Professor in the Faculty of Law at University 
of New Brunswick (Canada), argues that consent to posthumous reproduction should 
sometimes be presumed. Professor Young considers the interests at stake, especially 
the interests of the living in their own future posthumous reproduction and the 
interests of people who would like to bear a deceased person's child. She concludes 
that where an embryo has been created for reproductive purposes consent to 
posthumous reproductive use of that embryo should be presumed. Professor Young 
further argues that the context of a committed romantic relationship, in which 
children were contemplated, may justify presuming consent to posthumous 
reproduction.  
C.  Professor Maya Sabatello 
Maya Sabatello, Post-doctoral Research Fellow at Columbia University and 
Professor at New York University’s Center for Global Affairs, advocates that the 
protection of the interests and rights of the child should be the backdrop of courts' 
analysis regarding posthumously conceived children. She elaborates on this by 
incorporating children’s perspectives on the central issues at stake: parentage 
acknowledgement, family structures, identity, and inheritance, and social benefits. 
 
 
 
